Michigan Law Review
Volume 74

Issue 5

1976

The Right to Religious Freedom and World Public Order: The
Emerging Norm of Nondiscrimination
Myres S. McDougal
Yale Law School

Harold D. Lasswell
Yale Law School

Lung-chu Chen
Yale Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the Religion Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & Lung-chu Chen, The Right to Religious Freedom and World
Public Order: The Emerging Norm of Nondiscrimination, 74 MICH. L. REV. 865 (1976).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol74/iss5/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

THE RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER: THE EMERGING NORM OF
NONDISCRIMINATIONt
Myres S. McDougal*
Harold D. Lasswell**
Lung-chu Chen***

1.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

based upon religious beliefs and expressions forms
the basis for some of the most serious deprivations of civil and
political rights. 1 The religious beliefs and expressions that are commonly the ground for discrimination include all of the traditional
faiths and justifications from which norms of responsible conductthat is, judgments about right and wrong-are derived. These beliefs may be theological in the sense that they refer to a personalized
transempirical source of an unchallengeable message or metaphysical
in the sense that they are grounded upon nonpersonalized transempirical conceptions; sometimes they are more empirical, based upon
varying conceptions of science or fundamental humanity. 2 Deprivations may be imposed upon an individual because he refuses to accept
the established belief system, adheres to a belief system different from
the established one, attempts to create a new set of beliefs, expresses
doubt about existing belief systems, or explicitly challenges the validDISCRIMINATION

t This article is excerpted from a book to be published, Human Rights and
World Public Order. The authors acknowledge with thanks the criticism and comments of Professors W. Michael Reisman, Irving I. Zaretsky, and John Claydon. The
Ralph E. Ogden Foundation has been generous in its support of the studies from
which this article is drawn.
* Sterling Professor of Law, Emeritus, Yale Law School. B.C.L. 1930, Oxford
University; J.S.D. 1931, Yale; LLB. 1935, University of Mississippi.-Ed.
** Ford Foundation Professor of Law and Social Sciences, Emeritus, Yale Law
School. Ph.B. 1922, Ph.D. 1926, University of Chicago.-Ed.
*** Senior Research Associate, Yale Law School. LL.B. 1958, National Taiwan
University; LL.M. 1961, Northwestern University; LL.M. 1962, J.S.D. 1964, Yale
University.-Ed.
1. See generally M. BATES, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: AN INQUIRY (1945); A.
KR.ISHNASWAMI, STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE MATIER OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS AND
PRACTICES, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1 (1960); P. LANARES, LA LIBERTE
RELIGIEUSE DANS LES CONVENTIONS INTERNATIONALES ET DANS LE DROIT PUBLIC
GENERAL (1964); Abram, Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion, 8 J. INTL.
CoMMN. OF JURISTS, No. 2, at 40 (1967); Claydon, The Treaty Protection of
Religious Rights: U.N. Draft Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, 12 SANTA CLARA LAw.
403 (1972); Toth, Human Dignity and Freedom of Conscience, 10 WORLD JUSTICE
202 (1968).
2. A recent outstanding survey of religious beliefs is RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (I. Zaretsky & M. Leone eds. 1974) [hereinafter RELIGIOUS
MOVEMENTS]. For a diversity of religious perspectives, see T. DoBZHANSKY, THE
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ity of belief systems. 3 The individual may be deprived of rights either through formal community decision-making processes or
through less obvious workings of effective power. 4
Religious discrimination looms large in the histories of most of
the world's distinctive religions. The common theme of these histories (with different religions appearing alternatively as oppressors and
as victims) has been that of persecution; toleration has developed
only at relatively late stages. 5 For a long time, the established mode
by which many religions dealt with heretics or nonbelievers was short
and quick. The ultimate deprivation was imposed upon those who
failed to conform. 6 In more recent times, though toleration has
become widespread, religious discrimination still abounds and is the
source of repressive measures that deny individuals the most basic of
human freedoms. In the words of a United Nations study:
World-wide interest in ensuring the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion stems from the realization that this right is of
BIOLOGY OF ULTIMATE CONCERN (1967); M. ELIADE, PA1TERNS IN COMPARATIVE
RELIGION (R. Sheed transl. 1963); M. ELIADE, THE SACRED AND TIIE PROFANE (W.
Trash transl. 1961); S. FREUD, THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION (W. Robson-Scott
transl. 1928); J. HICK, PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION (1963); w. KAUFMANN, CRITIQUE
OF RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY (1958); W. LESSA & E. VOGT, READER IN COMPARATIVE
RELIGION (3d ed. 1972); H. LEWIS, PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION (1965); S. MCCASLAND,
G. CAmNS & D. Yu, RELIGIONS OF TIIE WORLD (1969); M. MEAD, TwENTIETH
CENTURY FAITH: HOPE AND SURVIVAL 83-87 (1972); A. MONTAGU, IMMORTALITY,
RELIGION, AND MORALS (1971); E. PARRINDER, COMPARATIVE RELIGION (1962); N.
SMART, THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE OF MANKIND (1969); J. WACH, THE COM·
PARATIVE STuoY OF RELIGIONS (1961); M. WEBER, THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION (T.
Parsons ed. 1963); J. YINGER, RELIGION, SOCIE1Y AND TIIE INDIVIDUAL (1957); J.
YINGER, THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION (1970).
3. Thus, deprivees can include atheists and agnostics. See generally T. ALTIZER &
w. HAMILTON, RADICAL THEOLOGY AND TIIE DEATH OF Goo (1966); C. CAMPBELL,
TOWARD A SOCIOLOGY OF !RRELIGION (1971); W. CLIFFORD, THE ETIIICS OF BELIEF,
AND OTHER EsSAYS (1876); J. DEWEY, A COMMON FAITH (1934); R. RODINSON, AN
ATIIEIST's VALUES (1964); G. VAHANIAN, THE DEATH OF Goo (1961).
4. Important deprivations may be imposed through the internal processes of
religious groups themselves. Sometimes these deprivations have the tacit approval of
government; upon occasion they become the functional equivalent of government. Cf.
Gerlach, Pentecostalism: Revolution or Counter-Revolution?, in RELIGIOUS MOVE·
MENTS, supra note 2, at 669-99; Kauper & Ellis, Religious Corporations and tlze Law,
71 MICH. L. REV. 1499, 1557-74 (1973).
5. See H. KAMEN, THE RISE OF TOLERATION (1967); Adeney, Toleration, 12
ENCYC. OF RELIGION AND ETHICS 360 (J. Hastings ed. 1958). See also J. BIGELOW,
TOLERATION AND OTHER EsSAYS AND STUDIES (1927); W. GARRISON, INTOLERANCE
(1934); G. MENSCHING, TOLERANCE AND TRUTH IN RELIGION (H. Klimkeit transl.
1971). In the words of Garrison:
History is made up very largely of the record of man's intolerance to man.
Part of that record is red with the blood of its victims and vibrant with their
groans. Part of it also is warm with the glow of the faith and zeal of those
who have sought, at their own peril, to turn others from the error of their ways
or to break down some system which they deemed hostile to the welfare of men.
But the story of intolerance is also the story of all the world's prophets and
~aviours, its moral leaders and social reformers, as well as its tyrants and inquisitors.
W. GARRISON, supra, at x.
6. See text at notes 28-38 infra.
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primary importance. In the past, its denial has led not only to untold
misery, but also to persecutions directed against entire groups of people. Wars have been waged in the name of religion or belief, either
with the aim of imposing upon the vanquished the faith of the victor
or as a pretext for extending economic or political domination. Although the number of such instances occurring in the second half of
our century is on the decline, it must not be forgotten that mankind
only recently has witnessed persecutions on a more colossal scale than
ever before. And even today, notwithstanding changes in the climate
of opinion, equality of treatment is not ensured for all religions and
beliefs, or for their followers, in certain areas of the world. 7
The relevant deprivations imposed upon individuals invariably
involve the rectitude value itself, denying participation in the formulation and expression of moral norms. Individuals may be denied,
both in form and in substance, the freedom to worship as they choose;
they may be terrorized from worshipping, or they may be brainwashed or coerced into following a belief system other than that of
their own choosing (e.g., compulsory conversions). 8 These types of
repressive measures are particularly likely to occur in those communities in which an established belief system is officially sanctioned and
sustained to the exclusion of other beliefs. 9 History is full of examples
7. A. KRISHNASWAMI, supra note 1, at v. In the words of Claydon:
Even a cursory survey of matters considered by the United Nations in the past
twenty-five years demonstrates the extent to which religious differences continue
to contribute to major and minor problems of world order. Such a list might
include the following items: religious persecution in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, 1949; the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan; the treatment of
Buddhists in South Vietnam, 1963; the actions of the People's Republic of China
in Tibet, 1959-61; the Cyprus problem; the continuing Middle East crisis; and
the current situation in Northern Ireland. In all of these cases the religious
factor has operated in varying degrees either to precipitate or to exacerbate an
international crisis; in most violence has been a component.
Claydon, supra note 1, at 403.
Useful contemporary area studies of the interaction of religion and politics include
R. BUSH, RELIGION IN COMMUNIST CHINA (1970); J. COQUJA, CHURCH AND STATE
LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES (1959); G. MAcEOIN, NORTHERN IRELAND: CAPTIVE OF
HISTORY 123-44 (1974); D. MACINNIS, RELIGIOUS POLICY AND PRACTICE IN COMMUNIST CHINA (1972); RELIGION, PoLmcs, AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE THIRD
WORLD (D. Smith ed. 1971); D. SCHMEISER, CIVIL LIBERTIES IN CANADA 54-124
(1964); SOUTH ASIAN POLITICS AND RELIGION (D. Smith ed. 1966).
S. See, e.g., Arnold, Persecution (Muhammadan), 9 ENCYC. OF RELIGION AND
ETHICS 765, 767 (J. Hastings ed. 1960). Similar treatment is reported to occur in the
Soviet Union. See v. CHALIDZE, To DEFEND THESE RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
SOVIET UNION 159 (G. Daniels transl. 1974). Cf. H. SMITH, THE RussIANS 417-38
(1976); Jancar, Religious Dissent in the Soviet Union, in DISSENT IN THE USSR:
POLITICS, IDEOLOGY, AND PEOPLE 191 (R. Tokes ed. 1975); Reddaway, Freedom of
Worship and the Law, in IN QUEST OF JusncE: PROTEST AND DISSENT IN THE SOVIET
UNION TODAY 62 (1970).
9. See, e.g., Roman Catholicism, History of, 15 ENCYC. BRIT. 1002, 1006-07 (15th
ed. 1974).
Underscoring the central importance of "religious persecution" to Marxism.
Solzhenitsyn offers this footnote: "Sergei Bulgakov showed in Karl Marx as a
Religious Type (1906) that atheism is the chief inspirational and emotional hub of
Marxism and that all the rest of the doctrine has simply been tacked on. Ferocious

868

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 74:865

of religious oppression through such means as the destruction of
altars, images, churches, temples, and the holy scriptures.10
Deprivations of power on rectitude grounds are dramatized by the
conflicts between church and state. 11 The religiously persecuted
have been forced to leave the community of which they were members and in consequence have been completely excluded from the
power processes of the body politic. For many, the result has been
centuries of wandering as homeless refugees and exiles in perpetual
fear and jeopardy-a phenomenon that has yet to see an end. 12 The
barbarity of banishment is sometimes confined within national
boundaries when the persecuted are dispatched to remote, sparsely
populated, and rugged frontiers. 13 Conversely, people may be denied egress, either temporarily or permanently, because of their relighostility to religion is Marxism's most persistent feature." A. SOLZHENITSYN, LB'ITER
TO 'IHE SOVIET LEADERS 58-59 (H. Sternberg transl. 1975). See also Bourdeaux,
Religions in the Soviet Union (1960-71): Introduction, in THE FoUR'IH WORLD:
VICTIMS OF GROUP OPPRESSION 218, 222 (B. Whitaker ed. 1972); Shararevich,
Socialism in Our Past and Future, in A. SoLZHENITSYN, et al., FROM UNDER THE
RUBBLE 26 (M. Scammell, et al. transl. 1975).
In the People's Republic of China, the Religious Affairs Bureau came into
existence in the early years of the regime. The functions of the Bureau include the
following:
1. To regularly investigate and study religious organizations and the activities
of their personnel.
2. To control all types of religious activity.
3. To lead both Catholics and Protestants into the Three-Self Movement, and
to organize Buddhists, Taoists, and Muslims for regular patriotic learning sessions.
4. To carry out thoroughly the religious policy of the central government.
5. To unceasingly teach and propagandize religious leaders and all believers
concerning policies of the state with respect to current situations in order to
raise their political awareness.
6. To bring church leaders closer to the government and push believers of all
religions into a positive alliance for the construction of socialism.
7. To strike at politically obstinate reactionaries in churches, and cooperate
with public security officers in order to tranquilize hidden counterrevolutionaries in all religions.
8. To entertain foreign religious guests.
R. BusH, supra note 7, at 31 (footnote omitted). See also D. MACINNIS, supra note
7, at 373; G. PATTERSON, CHRISTIANITY IN COMMUNIST CHINA 3-4 (1969). Other
works dealing with religion and communism include J. BENNETT, CHRISTIANITY AND
COMMUNISM TODAY (1970); H. CHAMBRE, CHRISTIANITY AND CoMMUNISM (R.
Trevett transl. 1960); M. D'ARCY, COMMUNISM AND CHRISTIANITY (1957); A.
GALTER, THE RED BOOK OF 'IHE PERSECUTED CHuRCH (1957); G, MACEoIN, THE
COMMUNIST WAR ON RELIGION (1951).
10. See, e.g., L. DAWIDOWICZ, THE WAR AGAINST THE JEWS 1933-1945, at 248
(1975); J. GOFF, THE PERSECUTION OF PROTESTANT CHRISTIANS IN COLOMBIA, 19481958, at 4/35-4/45 (1968) (SONDEOS No. 23); Adeney, supra note 5, at 361;
Gwatkin, Pers(!cution (Early Church), 9 .ENCYC. OF RELIGION AND ETHICS 742, 743,
747 (J. Hastings ed. 1960).
11. Cf. G. LEWY, RELIGION AND REVOLUTION (1974); S. STEINBERG, THE THIRTY
YEARS WAR AND 'IHE CONFLICT FOR EUROPEAN HEGEMONY 1600-1660, at 96-99
(1966); C. WEDGWOOD, THE THIRTY YEARS WAR (1938).
12. For a comprehensive historical account, see F. NORWOOD, STRANGERS AND
Ex!LES: A HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS REFUGEES (1969).
13. Whitley, Persecution (Modern Christian), 9 ENCYC, OF RELIGION AND E'IHICS
755, 758 (J. Hastings ed. 1960).
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ious background,14 and nationals of ceiitain religious faiths may be
denied access to their own country. 15 In some notorious inquisitions,
the methods employed against nonconformists have been completely
arbitrary, involving no less than a total denial of due process of law. 16
Less drastically, holding or expressing particular religious beliefs may
be made a criminal offense.17 The entire arsenal of criminal sanctions, including fine, imprisonment, banishment, and capital punishment, may be mobilized to enforce religious conformity.18 Another
frequent deprivation is to forbid religious nonconformists to hold
assemblies. 19
An individual's rights to vote or to hold office may be affected by
religious identification, even in communities with no established religion. "Where there is an Established Church or a State religion,"
according to a United Nations study, "persons who leave the officially
recognized religion are sometimes deprived of their political rights,
including the right to vote." 20 Sometimes, "clerics of the official
religion may be regarded as officials of the Government while those
of other groups do not enjoy such a status."21 Eligibility for high
governmental posts, including the head of state, may, "either by law
or by tradition," be confined to those who hold the officially sanctioned religious beliefs. 22 In communities where "several religions
are officially recognized," discrimination may result from the use of
"quota systems" in allocating "elective and appointive posts in the
public service"; such systems may stress "community membership"
14. For a discussion of such practices in the Soviet Union, see J. INGLES, STUDY
OF DISCRIMINATION IN REsPECT OF nm RIGHTS OF EVERYONE To LEAVE ANY
COUNTRY, INcuJDING His OWN, AND To RETURN TO His COUNTRY 25-29, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/220/Rev.1 (1963); W. KoREY, THE SOVIET CAGE: ANTI-SEMmsM IN
RUSSIA 184-200 (1973). See also V. CHALIDZE, supra note 8, at 92-114; A. SAKHAROV, MY CoUNTRY AND nm WORLD 51-61 (G. Daniels transl. 1975); A. SAKHAROV, SAKHAROV SPEAKS 159-63 (H. Salisbury ed. 1974); Shroeter, How They Left:
Varieties of Soviet Jewish Exit Experience, 2 SOVIET JEWISH AFFAIRS 9 (1972).
15. J. INGLES, supra note 14, at 28-29.
16. The methods employed have been said to include "[t]he spy system, delation,
secrecy, torture, the union in one person of judge and accuser, the hindrances put in
the way of the victim's defence, the direct interest of the tribunal in a condemnation
which secured the confiscation of the property of the accused." Fawkes, Persecution
(Roman Catholic), 9 ENCYc. OF REUGION AND Em1cs 749, 753 (J. Hastings ed.
1960). For a detailed case study, see H. KAMEN, THE SPANISH lNQmsmoN 137-96
(1965).
17. See, e.g., Gwatkin, supra note 10, at 742, 746.
18. See, e.g., Nelson, The Theory of Persecution, in PERSECUTION AND LmERlY:
EsSAYS IN HONOR OF GEORGE LINCOLN BURR 3 (1931) (Christian practices). See
generally Labrousse, Religious Toleration, 4 DICTIONARY OF THE HISTORY OF !DEAS
112, 115 (P. Wiener ed. 1973).
19. Gwatkin, supra note 10, at 747.
20. H. SANTA CRuz, STuDY OF DISCRIMINATION IN mE MATTER OF PoUTICAL
RIGHTS 34, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/213/Rev.1 (1962).
21. Id.
22. Id. See also J. LAPoNCE, THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES 49-50 (1960).
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rather than "merit" and exclude from public service "members of
religious communities not recognized by the State."23
In the area of educational opportunities, individuals may find
access to public education, or educational resources and facilities,
restricted because of their religious backgrounds. Such deprivations
cannot be dismissed as historic curiosities. According to a United
Nations study, "qualified candidates in some parts of the world still
find their religion a barrier when they apply for admission to certain
educational institutions."24 "Although this discrimination is not
overt and is in many cases contrary to the law," the study adds, "it
nevertheless persists and affects a considerable number of persons."2G
The intricate relationship between religion and education, especially
in regard to religious instruction, may precipitate community tension
and conflict. 26 In addition, among the ubiquitous means of maintaining religious conformity are the policies designed to preserve an
ignorant public and to stifle individual freedom of expression. Notorious examples of book burning abound in history. 27 Limited access
to the means of enlightenment often results in limited opportunities
for the acquisition and exercise of socially useful skills.
In a community in which discrimination takes the form of persecution, severe deprivations of well-being may ensue, ranging from the
imprisonment and torture of individuals to the physical extermination
of entire populations (genocide). 28 The barbarity of such depriva23. H. SANTA CRuz, supra note 20, at 35. Difficult problems arise when an
individual leaves a group in which religious process is the functional equivalent of
civil process. See, e.g., Zaretsky, Jesus in Jerusalem 1973: Mission Impossible?, in
HEBREW CHRISTIANITY: ToE THIR.TEENTII TRIBE 341, 350-52 (B. Sobel ed. 1974).
24. C. .AMMOUN, SnIDY OF DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION 56, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/181/Rev.1 (1957).
25. Id.
26. This is- most visible in cases in which proselytization is used as a form of
public information. See Zaretsky, supra note 23, at 383-85. Cf. L. DB CAMP, ToB
GREAT MONKEY 'TRIAL (1968); EVOLUTION AND RELIGION: ToE CONFLICT BETWEEN
ScIENCE AND ToEoLOGY IN MODERN .AMERICA (G. Kennedy ed. 1957); R. MORGAN,
ToB PoLmcs OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICT (1968).
21. See, e.g., Gwatkin, supra note 10, at 747.
In a fashion less dramatic than book burning, the Nationalist Chinese government,
in January 1975, confiscated some 2300 copies of Bibles in romanized Taiwanese
(some of them in the Tayal tribal language) from the Protestant community in
Taiwan. This much protested act in violation of religious freedom is another step in
a series of governmental measures designed to ban the use of the Taiwanese language
and to suppress the Taiwanese (non-Chinese) identity of the Taiwanese people. See
The Washington Post, May 2, 1975, at C7, col. 4; The Confiscation of the Taiwanese
Bibles by the Nationalist Chinese Government, 11 MAYFLOWER 7 (July 20, 1975)
(published by the Formosan Club of America, Inc.); Joint Statement Concerning the
Taiwanese Bibles, 116 TAIWAN CHENGLIAN 23 (June 1975) (published by World
United Formosans for Independence); Tang, On the Incident of Confiscating the
Taiwanese Bibles, 177 TAIWAN CHENGLIAN-34 (July 1975).
28. The Nazi Holocaust is a well-remembered example of such practices. See R.
HILBERG, DESTRUCTION OF TiiE EUROPEAN JEWS (1961); H. KRAUSNICK, H, BUCH•
HEIM, M. BROSZHAT & H. JACOBSEN, ToE .ANATOMY OF THE SS-STATE (1968); N.
LEVIN, ToE HOLOCAUST: ToE DESTRUCTION OF TiiE EUROPEAN JEWRY (1968); R.
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tions has been vividly recorded: "[T]he extirpation of heresy by
fetter and by fire"; 29 victims "worried by dogs, or crucified, or burned
as lights for the performances" in emperor's gardens;30 victims "left to
die of famine in prison";31 issuance of edicts requiring "all persons,"
including "women and boys," to be sacrificed;32 "great massacre";33
"public executions" ;34 "wholesale burnings" ;35 "the most terrible
form of fire and slaughter";36 extermination "by sword, by hurling
from. the summits of cliffs, by prolonged confinement in deadly
prisons, at the stake, in the mines";37 and survivors "sent in chains
into slavery."38
With regard to the right to acquire and dispose of property, an
individual's religious identification not infrequently becomes a source
of discrimination. Nonconformists may have their property confiscated, 39 groups who profess particular religious faiths may be
forbidden the right to own land, 40 public funds may be dispensed
MANVELL & H. FltAENKEL, THE INCOMPARABLE CRIME (1967); L. POLIAKOV, HARVEST
OF HATE (1954); G. REITLINGER, THE FINAL SoLUTION (2d ed. 1968); J. TENENBAUM, RACE AND REICH (2d ed. 1956); Holocaust, 8 ENCYC. JUDAICA 827 (1971).
29. Labrousse, supra note 18, at 115.
30. Gwatkin, supra note 10, at 744.
31. Id. at 746.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 747.
34. Id. at 748.
35. Id.
36. Geden, Persecution (Indian), 9 ENCYC. OF RELIGION AND ETHICS 762, 764 (J.
Hastings ed. 1960).
37. 2 T. LINDSAY, A HISTORY OF THE REFORMATION 601 (1907). Hence, this
observation: "But the horrors enacted in open court are a very small part of the
mischiefs of persecution. We must take account of imprisonments and hardships
from which even death is sometimes a relief, and of the sufferings of those who live
in fear of death or yield to fear of death. Worse than this is the brutalizing of the
persecutors, and worst of all the demoralization of the persecuted." Gwatkin, supra
note 10, at 748.
38. Gwatkin, supra note 10, at 747.
Deprivations are sometimes inflicted by the victims themselves because of religious beliefs in the community. Such believers may deny themselves the benefits of
modem medical treatment by relying on spiritual healing only, by refusing vaccination and physical examination, and by refusing blood transfusions. See generally C.
ANTIEAU, P. CARROLL & T. BURKE, RELIGION UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS 67-72
(1965); M. COLE, JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES (1955); D. GROSS, THE CASE FOR SPIRITUAL
HEALING (1958); J. VAN BAALEN, THE CHAOS OF CULTS (3d ed. 1960); Burkholder,
"The Law Knows No Heresy": Marginal Religious Movements and tlze Courts, in
RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT, supra note 2, at 27, 36-41; Garrison, Sectarianism and

Psychosocial Adjustment: A Controlled Comparison of Puerto Rican Pentecostals and
Catholics, in id. at 298-319; Pfeffer, The Legitimation of Marginal Religions in the
United States, in id. at 9, 17-20; Torrey, Spiritualists and Shamans as Psychotherapists: An Account of Original Anthropological Sin, in id. at 330-37; Cawley, Criminal
Liability in Faith Healing, 39 MINN. L. REV. 48 (1954); Note, The Refused Blood
Transfusion: An Ultimate Challenge for Law and Morals, 10 NATURAL L.F. 202
(1965).
39. See, e.g., Gwatkin, supra note 10, at 747.
40. Such prohibition may take different forms: (1) only members of the state
religion can own land; (2) no members of any religion may own land; and (3)
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in a manner that clearly discriminates against certain religious
groups, 41 and religious quotas may be imposed in employment. 42 In
the words of an International Labour Office (ILO) study:
The most numerous charges of discrimination would seem to relate
to access to jobs in both the public service and the private sector.
The acts of discrimination complained of appear to consist for the
most part in the imposition of religious tests in selecting candidates
for public appointments and the granting of preferences to members
of particular faiths when engaging workers or taking on apprentices.
However, discrimination may also occur in certain situations against
people who belong to any religion at all, against atheists or against
those who do not profess any faith whatever. 48

Religious discrimination continues to have an important effect
upon the shaping and sharing of the affection value. People of
different religious backgrounds may be prohibited by legal or religious proscription from marrying one another. 44 Violators may be
subjected to severe legal penalties or to social opprobrium. On a
more general level, religious barriers tend to stifle the growth of
congenial personal relationships.
Finally, even in the most modern societies it is not always easy for
people of different religions to share a sense of mutual respect.
Religious antagonists have been "D]ikened to the poisoner of wells,
the arsonist, the counterfeiter, and the murderer--the heresiarch and
the votaries whom he enticed were pictured as public pests which the
authorities had the solemn obligation to purge from the face of the
earth."45 At one time, religious nonconformists were simply "reduced to slavery." 46 Today, individuals may enjoy differing degrees
of prestige because of differences in religious affiliations. Religion
almost invariably figures significantly in the class structure of a
community, especially where it is highly rigidified and hierarchical. 47
members of some religions subjected to persecution may not own land. For instance,
see the case of Emma Berger in Israel described in Zaretsky, supra note 23, at 388,
398 n.27.
41. See P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 18-19 (1964); J. LAPONCB,
supra note 22, at 48.
42. W. KOREY, supra note 14, at 52.
On occasion, discrimination in employment may be imposed against people who
are religiously forbidden to work on those days when the employer wants them to
work. See Burkholder, supra note 38, at 33-36; Pfeffer, supra note 38, at 17-20.
43. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICB, FIGIITING DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
AND OCCUPATION 98 (1968).
44. See A KRISHNASWAMI, supra note 1, at 38; 3 A. STOKES, CiluRCH AND STATB
IN THE UNITED SrATES 52-56 (1950). Cf. Geden, supra note 36, at 764-65.
45. Labrousse, supra note 18, at 115.
46. See Gwatkin, supra note 10, at 747.
47. See McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, The Protection of Respect and Human
Rights: Freedom of Choice and World Public Order, 24 AM. U. L. REv. 919, 983-84
(1915). See also T. O'DBA, THB SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 55-97 (1966).
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BASIC COMMUNITY POLICIES

In a community genuinely committed to the goal of human
dignity, one paramount policy should be to honor and defend the
freedom of the individual to choose a fundamental orientation toward
the world. One of the most distinctive acts available to man as a
rational being is the continual redefinition of the self in relation to
others and to the cosmos. Thus, each individual must be free to
search for the basic postulates in a perspective that will unify the
experiences of life. All practices that both differentiate among individuals upon the basis of religious beliefs and expressions, whether
conceived and justified in transempirical or empirical terms, and
deprive the individual of the freedom to inquire and choose are
wholly incompatible with preferred policy. 48
Even so fundamental a freedom as that of religious inquiry,
belief, and communication must, of course, be exercised and protected
with due regard for the comparable rights of others and for the
aggregate common interest in the preservation of all basic human
rights. 49 Whether a particular practice is an appropriate exercise of
religious freedom or is an unreasonable invasion of the rights of
others may occasionally present a difficult and delicate question for
community choice. The rational procedure for guiding community
choice about such questions in the area of religious freedom, as in the
case of other rights, is the disciplined use of a contextual analysis that
investigates and assays the consequences of available options; no prior
definitional exercises, however elaborate, can eliminate the need for
inquiry and choice in the social process. 50
48. The arbitrariness of differentiations by generic reference to religion is evident
in the difficulties of defining "religion." As with the notion of "race," specialists
on religion as well as nonspecialists can hardly agree upon a commonly acceptable
definition. What are the criteria of "religious" groups: birth, devotions by one or
both parents, self-definition and proclamation, conversion, conversion by group, or
something else? Labeling people on the basis of religion, as on the basis of race, is
easily susceptible of abuse. See Hollingsworth, Constitutional Religious Protection:
Antiquated Oddity or Vital Reality?, 34 Omo Sr. L.J. 15 (1973); Zaretsky, supra note
23.
49. The presumption against discrimination upon grounds of religion is not
intended to obscure the fact that a community may have a deep interest in the quality
of the rectitude standard of its members. Some religious concepts may be highly
inimical to a public order of human dignity. It may on occasion be necessary to
distinguish between discrimination upon religious grounds and the maintenance of an
appropriate system of rectitude. The formation and proselytization of religious
movements that emphasize some conceptions of pacifism may, for instance, be
regarded as inimical to community security in some contexts.
See, e.g., Marnell, Civil Disobedience and the Majority of One, in RELIGION AND
nm PUBLIC ORDER 115 (D. Giannella ed. 1969). Cf., e.g., Casad, Compulsory
Education and Individual Rights, in id. at 51; Coughlin, Values and the Constitution,
in id. at 89.
50. See McDougal, Human Rights and World Public Order: Principles of Content
and Procedure for Clarifying General Community Policy, 14 VA. J. INTL. L. 387
(1974); McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 47, at 927-37, 1037. See also Mc-
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None of the arguments historically put forward to impugn the
policy of religious toleration carry much weight in a complex and
interactive world. Attempts have been made to justify intolerance on
the ground that a single faith has unique access to revealed truth (a
monopoly of truth), 51 or that intolerance is necessary for the "salvation" of individuals who are outside the mainstream of religious
belief. 52 More secular and pragmatic arguments allege the necessity
of achieving and maintaining community unity and cohesion against
the perils of fragmentation into nonconformist groups. r;a The specious nature of claims to a monopoly of truth or exclusive access to
transempirical salvation would appear amply demonstrated by the
failure of any of the diverse belief systems present in the contemporary world to establish unique or exclusive successes in either empiriDougal, Lasswell & Chen, The Aggregate lnteresi in Shared Respect and Huma11
Rights: The Harmonization of Public Order and Civic Order (forthcoming).
In response to the conventional "action-belier' dichotomy for policy differentiation used in American jurisprudence, Kurland has emphasized that "this proposed
distinction • . • [is] obviously not a line that can provide real assistance in resolving
these knotty problems." P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND Tl:IB LAW 22 (1962). Similarly,
Burkholder observes:
If we ask just how the limits of religious freedom are set by the courts, it is
clear that no one definitive rationale for adjudication has emerged. The jurists
have developed a number of testing procedures-secular regulation, interest
weighing, clear and present danger, compelling state interest, alternative means
-but only the first of these offers a self-evident approach. In creating the
possibility of carving out an exemption from existing legislation for certain kinds
of religiously motivated action, and justifying this exemption by balancing religious conviction against public policy, the Sherbert formula tended to favor a
case-by-case procedure. We have seen how court opinions may vary widely in
their application of this balancing technique.
Burkholder, supra note 38, at 45.
51. In his essay on Sir James MacKintosh, Macaulay described such views: "I am
in the right, and you are in the wrong. When you are the stronger, you ought to
tolerate me; for it is your duty to tolerate truth. But when I am stronger, I shall
persecute you; for it is my duty to persecute error." T. MACAULAY, CRITICAL AND
HISTORICAL EssAYS 336 (1870). Cf. N. SODERBLOM, THE LIVING GoD: BASAL FORMS
OF PERSONAL RELIGION (1933); R. ZAEHNER, AT SUNDRY 'IiMES (1958).
52. "[A) body of truths existed, some still latent, some explicitly stated in
dogmas, necessary and vital; so vital that, unless a man accepted them, he would
without doubt perish everlastingly •••." Whitley, supra note 13, at 755. Augustine
is said to have compared "the laws against heretics to the restraint imposed upon
lunatics or persons suffering under delirium, who would otherwise destroy themselves
and others." Fawkes, supra note 16, at 751, 752. Cf. S. BRANDON, HISTORY, 'IiME
AND DEITY (1965); S. BRANDON, MAN AND His DESTINY IN THE GREAT RELIGIONS
(1962).
53. Labrousse has aptly summarized: "If one reflects upon it, one is struck by the
coherence and doctrinal consistency of the ideological justifications provided for the
practice of religious intolerance. The system of justification stands up admirably on
all levels, and the unavoidable sociological necessity for a minimum consensus gives it
an imperative accent. This necessity for consensus has not disappeared from among
us •••." Labrousse, supra note 18, at 115-16. A similar observation was offered
by Fawkes: "Cohesion was the first need of primitive societies; it was more important
that the group should cohere than it should progress. Innovation, therefore, was put
down with a strong hand: it introduced disunion and dissipated energy-the argument
is not unknown in our own time." Fawkes, supra note 16, at 749.
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cal or transempirical inquiry. 54 Moreover, underlying all of the
theories of religious intolerance is an assumption that is essentially
contrary to respect for human dignity-an assumption that implies a
profound distrust of the wisdom of allowing individuals to take the
responsibility for their own beliefs. If human experience is a reliable
guide, it would appear that individuals will not experience an intense
demand on the self to act responsibly on behalf of the common
interest unless they are free to pursue their own search to relate the
ego to other beings and to the universal manifold of events. The
attempt to impose uniformity in such fundamental matters stifles and
frustrates personal development and fu1fillment. Similarly, it would
appear that, in the long run, social order and individual well-being
can be better achieved through open examination and choice of
fundamental orientations than through regimented religious monolithism. 55
The importance of individual freedom of inquiry and commitment to community consensus about shaping and sharing of values
has been aptly summarized by Abram:
Since that formative period of the concepts of religious liberty in the
seventeenth century, differing justifications of the right to freedom of
thought, conscience or belief have been advanced. Some, like Mill,
have stressed the fallibility of human thought and belief; others, like
Dewey, have argued the social benefits derivable from plurality of
belief and freedom of inquiry; and others have calculated the comparative risks for social value of a policy of freedom, as opposed to
the risks of repression. One conclusion from the number and variety
of such justifications is that no single theological, secular or philosophical foundation is presupposed in the belief in the right to freedom
of thought, conscience and religion. Defenders of the ideal and institutions of freedom do not and need not share metaphysical, theological or psychological beliefs; rather, they share a commitment to the
54. See generally w. CHRISTIAN, MEANING AND TR.um IN RELIGION (1964); B.
MITCHELL, THE JUSTIFICATION OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF ( 1973).
55. The classic exposition of this policy is J. LocKE, LBTI'ERS CONCERNING
TOLERATION (1765). In 1689, the year the Act of Toleration was proclaimed in
England, Locke's first Letter was anonymously published in Holland in Latin and
translated into English immediately afterward. Three other Letters soon followed,
largely in response to criticism. Emphasizing that the legitimate sphere of the state
extends to external matters rather than internal matters such as religion, Locke
maintained that not only the basic doctrines and articles of faith, but also the outward
manifestations and rites of worship are to be kept beyond the reach of the civil
authority. Not only religious toleration but also disestablishment of religion was
suggested.
See R. AARON, JOHN LOCKE 24-25, 39-40, 52, 295-99 (1937); J. DUNN, THE
PoLmCAL THOUGHT OF JOHN LocKE 27-40 (1969).
·For an excellent contemporary exposition of the policies favoring toleration, see
P. KAUPER, supra note 41, at 13-44. Cf. R. BAINTON, THE TR.AVAIL OF RELIGIOUS
LmERTY (1951); s. HOOK, RELIGION IN A FREE Socu:;ry (1967); P. MILLER, ET AL.,
RELIGION AND FREEDOM OF THOUGIIT (1954); C. NORTiiCOTT, RELIGIOUS LmERlY
(1948); R. POLLARD, CONSCIBNCE AND LmERTY (1940).
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value of freedom in the life of the community and an appreciation
of the fruits of freedom for society and the individual. 66

ill.

TR.ENDS IN DECISION

The development of transnational principles of religious freedom
begins within the body politic of national communities. Even within
these communities, the journey toward religious tolerance has been
slow and tortuous. "Ancient society," it has been noted, "was essentially intolerant."67 Though the concepts of religious toleration and
religious freedom were articulated at relatively early stages in history, 58 their transformation into national prescription and practice has
been gradual. "Tolerance," observed Arcot Krishnaswami in his
outstanding study, "was accorded, in the beginning, to one or a few
specified religions or beliefs; and only later was it extended to all such
groups. Moreover, the measure of tolerance extended to various
groups was often very narrow at first, and only by a gradual expansion was full equality achieved." 69 Krishnaswami also noted that
"[s]truggles for freedom of religion and conscience have occurred
chiefly in Europe. For many historic non-European religions, which
developed without having the feeling of possessing absolute and
exclusive religious truth, the problem of toleration did not take so
acute a form." 60
In Europe, the drive toward religious toleration became significant after the Protestant Reformation. 61 The formal incorporation of
the principle of religious toleration into national law first appeared in
Switzerland and Transylvania, two relatively small multi-religious
communities bordering the great empires. 62 In Switzerland, under
the Peaces of Kappel of 1529 and 1531, each canton was empowered
to decide which faith, Reformed or Catholic, its inhabitants would
observe. 63 In the "common bailiwicks, ruled by Reformed and Cath56. Abram, supra note 1, at 44-45.
57. Gwatkin, supra note 10, at 743.
58. See Bainton, Sebastian Castellio and the Toleration Controversy of the
Sixteenth Century, in PERSECUTION AND LIBERTY: EssAYS JN HONOR OF GEORGE
LINCOLN BURR 183 (1931). Cf. M. BATES, supra note 1, at 378-473; D. BURT, THE.
STATE AND RELIGIOUS TOLERATION: AsPECTS OF TiiB CHURCH-STATE THEORIES OF
FoUR CHRISTIAN THINKERS (1960); Bainton, The Parable of the Tares as the Proof
Text for Religious Liberty to the End of the Sixteenth Century, 1 CHURCH HIST. 67
(1932).
59. A. KrusHNASWAMI, supra note 1, at 4.
60. Quoted in Toth, supra note 1, at 208.
61. See generally R. BAINTON, THE REFORMATION OF nm SIXTBBNTII CENTURY
(1952); M. Bates, supra note 1, at 148-86; 0. CHADWICK, THE REFORMATION (1965);
G. ELTON, REFORMATION EUROPE, 1517-1599 (1964); H. GRIMM, THE REFORMATION
ERA, 1500-1650, at 588-92 (1954); T. LINDSAY, supra note 37; R. POST, THE. MODERN
DEVOTION: CONFRONTATION WITH REFORMATION AND HUMANISM (1968); Bainton,
The Struggle for Religious Liberty, 10 CHURCH HIST. 95 (1941).
62. Toth, supra note 1, at 209.
63. A. KrusHNASWAMI, supra note 1, at 4; Toth, supra note 1, at 209.
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olic cantons in common," 64 the Catholic minorities were allowed to
adhere to their faith alongside the Protestant majority. 65 In the
Principality of Transylvania (then part of the Kingdom of Hungary),
individuals enjoyed freedom of conscience and religion as early as
1538 under a decree by the Diet of Torda, 66 which was reaffirmed in
1571. In 1555, Germany officially justified freedom of religion in
terms of "the will of the sovereignty," "the Raison d'etat." 67 In
France, ,after the religious wars of 1562 to 1598, Henry IV issued the
famous Ediot of Nantes, conferring upon ithe Calvinists. (the Hugu~
nots) specific civil liberties, including "the right to worship in specified
places." 68 In England, the Toleration Act of 1689 secured personal
toleration for Protestants of all sorts, although Protestant dissenters
from the Church of England still remained under certain disabilities. 69
The French and American revolutions brought with them a shift
in "emphasis from the principle of mere toleration under the aegis of
enlightened despotism to that of a more effective freedom and equality of worship." 70 The Declaration of the Rights of Man, issued in
1789 after the French Revolution, specified freedom of religious expression as within the scope of human rights entitled to protection:
''No man is to be interfered with because of his opinions, not even
because of religious opinions, provided his avowal of them does not
disturb public order as established by law." 71 Many European immigrants who settled in the New World brought with them the growing
expectation of religious freedom, and the principle of religious liberty
gradually spread throughout the colonies. The Constitution of the
United States prescribed, in article VI, that "no religious Test shall
ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust
under the United States." The first amendment, adopted in 1791,
further stated that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." 72 With
64. A. KrusHNASWAMI, supra note 1, at 4.
65. Id.; Toth, supra note 1, at 209.
66. Toth, supra note 1, at 209.
61. Id. This was based on the doctrine "cujus regio eius religio" embodied in the
Treaty of Augsburg of 1555.
68. A. KruSHNASWAMI, supra note 1, at 5. Unfortunately, the Edict of Nantes of
1598 was revoked in 1685 by Louis XIV, who ordered the destruction of the Calvinist
temples and forbade Calvinists to leave the country.
69. M. BATES, supra note 1, at 168-79.
70. De Ruggiero, Religious Freedom, in 13 ENcrc. Soc. Ser. 239, 244 (E.
Selgman & A. Johnson eds. 1934).
71. BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 9 (I. Brownlie ed. 1971).
72. This part of the first amendment contains both the establishment clause and
the free-exercise clause. ''The essence of the religious freedom guaranteed by our
Constitution is therefore this: no religion shall either receive the state's support or
incur its hostility." West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 654
(1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Similarly, Konvitzhas observed:
The Free Exercise Clause protects one against coercion to do what one does not
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the passage of time, this fundamental guarantee of religious freedom,
building upon the principle of separation of church and state, has been
amplified and strengthened by a series of judicial decisions. 73
Influenced by the examples set by France and the United States,
"[i]n the written constitutions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the guarantee of freedom of religion appears with impressive
uniformity." 74 In the Soviet Union, for example, shortly after the
February Revolution of 1917, legal protection was accorded to freedom of conscience, "including the right to profess any religion or to
profess none." 75 Following the October Revolution, Lenin reaffirmed this right by proclaiming in January 1918, "the separation of
the Church from the State and the School from the Church," thereby
believe or approve; the Establishment Clause protects one against coercion to
do even what one would want to do voluntarily and what one would approve
if it were done freely. Taken together, their purpose is not to degrade or weaken
religion in any respect whatsoever, but, on the contrary, as with the other guarantees of the First Amendment, to recognize and to implement the belief that
"Almighty God hath created the mind free"; and that man is not man unless
his mind remains free; and that God is not served except by a mind that is free.
Had God wanted a coerced worship, He would have created not man but an unfree agent; and what God did not choose to do, the government a fortiori may
not do.
M. KoNVITZ, ExPANDING LIBERTIES 29 (1966) (emphasis original).
73. In his recent study, Pfeffer observes that
on the whole the American people have been faithful to the commitment that,
the business of God is not that of Caesar. This does not mean that there have
been no deviations and lapses. Although the national Constitution contains no
reference to God, practically every State Constitution does invoke His name
(usually in the preamble) and acknowledges the people's dependence on Him.
Christmas is a national holiday; legislatures, national and State, open their sessions with prayer; prayer meetings are sporadically held in the White House; "In
God We Trust" is to be found on the currency of the realm, and "under God"
in our Pledge of Allegiance. These and similar instances of governmental religiosity are, however, marginal and of little significance. • . •
L. PFEFFER, Goo, CAESAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION 345-46 (1915).
On the general question of church and state in the United States, see S. Conn,
THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA (1902); T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N,
DORSEN, PoLmCAL AND CML RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 736-854 (student ed.
1967); P. KAUPER, supra note 41; M. KoNVITZ, supra note 72, at 3-47; M. KoNVITZ,
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CONSCIENCE (1968); P. KURLAND, supra note SO;
MARNELL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA
(1964); R MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION (1972); L. PFEFFER,
CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM (rev. ed. 1967); B. SCHWARTZ, RIGHTS OF THE PERSON:
EQUALITY, BELIEF AND DIGNITY 649-709 (1968); A. STOKES, supra note 44; A.
STOKES & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 1964);
TORPEY, JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AMERICA (1948); Bittker,
Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE LJ. 1285 (1969); Burkholder, supra
note 38; Hollingsworth, supra note 48; Kauper, The Supreme Court and the Establishment Clause: Back to Everson?, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 107 (1974); Pfeffer, supra
note 38; Pfeffer, Uneasy Trinity: Church, State, and Constitution, 2 Civ. LIBERTIES
REv., No. 1, at 13S (1975); Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment
Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692 (1968). Cf. J. BENNETT, CHRISTIANS AND THE STATE
(1958).
74. H. LAUTERPACHT, AN INTERNATIONAL BILL OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN 10S
(1945). For a detailed account of those constitutional provisions for religious
liberty, see M. BATES, supra note 1, at 504-41.
15. A. KRISHNASWAMI, supra note 1, at 6.
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abolishing the dominance of the Orthodox Church prevailing under
Czarist Russia and guaranteeing "the equality of all religions." 76
More recently, inspired by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and other related pronouncements, the constitutions of the
newly independent states have prominently incorporated religious
freedom and equality into the proteoted sphere of human rights. 77
The trends toward religious freedom and equality within national
communities have not been isolated events. They have influenced
one another and, in so doing, have brought about transnational
expectations of religious liberty that, in turn, have strengthened national practice. Building upon the doctrine of natural rights as a
source of transnational authority, Hugo Grotius (and other prominent
international lawyers after him) emphasized that, in the same
sense that international law is important to the maintenance of religious toleration, is religious toleration indispensable to a stable
international order. 78 Thus, Krishnaswami noted that, "[e]ven before the concept of freedom of thought, conscience and religion was
recognized in national law-and partly because it had not been so
recognized-the practice evolved of making treaty stipulations ensuring certain rights to individuals or groups professing a religion or
belief different from that of the majority in the country."79 In 1536,
the King of France and the Ottoman Emperor concluded a treaty
conferring various liberties, including freedom of religion, upon
French subjects within the Ottoman territory;80 these stipulations in
the form of "capitulations" in peace treaties "became the model for
many later treaties of this sort as the capitulation system spread
during the seventeenth, eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries." 81
The Treaty of Westphalia, concluded in 1648 after the Thirty Years'
War, represented an important step toward ensuring toleration both
for Protestants in Catholic states and for Catholics in Protestant
states, although it fell short of affording religious freedom to all individuals and groups. 82 Another landmark was ,the Treaty of Berlin of
1878, pursuant to which the newly established states of Bulgaria,
Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and the Sublime Porte (the Ottoman
Empire) undertook to ensure religious freedom to all ·their inhabi76.
77.
1967);
78.

Id. Cf. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 74, at 106.
Cf. A. CARRILLO DE ALBORNOZ, RELIGIOUS LmER1Y 160-62 (J. Drury transl.
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (Counci!ium. vol. 18, 1966).
R. BAINTON, supra note 61, at 16-17. Cf. M. MANTON, RELIGIOUS PRO-

HmmoNS UNDER THE MEXICAN CONSTITUTION BEFORE THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND
THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 12-28 ( 1934); R. HIGGINS, CONFLICT OF INTERESTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 17-22 (1965).
79. A. KRISHNASWAMI, supra note 1, at 11.
80. See id.; Toth, supra note 1, at 210.
81. A. KRISHNASWAMI, supra note 1, at 11.
82. Id. See also C. ECKHARDT, THE PAPACY AND WORLD AFFAms: As REFLECTED
IN THE SECULARIZATION OF POLITICS (1937).
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tants. 83 Thus, in Tegard to Bulgaria, the Treaty provided in article 5:
The difference of religious creeds and confessions shall not be alleged against any person as a ground for exclusion or incapacity in
matters relating to the enjoyment of civil and political rights, admission to public employments, functions, and honours, or the exercise
of the various professions and industries in any locality whatsoever.
The freedom and outward exercise of all forms of worship are
assured to all persons belonging to Bulgaria, as well as to foreigners,
and no hindrance shall be offered either to the hierarchical organization of the different communions, or to their relations with their spiritual chiefs. 84
Similar provisions were incorporated in article 27 (regarding Montenegro), 85 article 35 (regarding Serbia), 86 and article 44 (regarding
Romania). 87 Additional obligations were imposed upon the Ottoman Empire in article 62:
All persons shall be admitted, without distinction of religion, to
give evidence before the tribunals;
Ecclesiastics, pilgrims, and monks of all nationalities travelling in
Turkey in Europe, or in Turkey in Asia, shall enjoy the same rights,
advantages, and privileges . . . .
The right of official protection by the Diplomatic and Consular
Agents of the Powers in Turkey is recognized both as regards the
above-mentioned persons and their religious, charitable, and other establishments in the Holy Places and elsewhere . . . .
The monks of Mount Athos, of whatever country they may be
natives, shall be maintained in their former possessions and advantages, and shall enjoy, without exception, complete equality of rights
and prerogatives. 88
Those peace treaties containing provisions regarding religious
freedom, from 1648 (Westphalia) to 1878 (Berlin), shared an overriding concern: the protection of religious minorities by guaranteeing
freedom of conscience and religion. 89 It was this same concern that
inspired the early development of the doctrines and practices of humanitarian intervention in customary international law. In the words
of Ganji:
The history of international protection of Minorities to the early
part of the 20th Century is that of the international protection of
religious Minorities. If not all, the greater part of the history of humanitarian intervention is the history of intervention on behalf of per83. The text of the Treaty of Berlin, signed on July 13, 1878, is reprinted in 2
1814-1914, at 551-77 (M. Hurst ed. 1972).
84. Id. at 555-56.
85. Id. at 564.
86. Id. at 567.
81. Id. at 570-71.
88. Id. at 575.
89. See M. BATES, supra note 1, at 477-84.
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secuted religious minorities. These interventions were as a rule initiated by states whose people were linked by ties of religious belief
to the persecuted minorities of the state intervened against. As far
back as the latter part of the 17th Century there is, in the history
of international relations, evidence of international protection of religious minorities undertaken by the European Powers. 90
In addition to inserting provisos into peace treaties, states have
often inserted provisions guaranteeing religious freedom into bilateral
treaties of amity, commerce, and navigation.91 This type of protection was particularly favored by Great Britain and the United States.
For example, in order to ensure religious freedom for Americans
abroad, the United States included such protective clauses in the
treaties of friendship and commerce with The Netherlands (1782),
with Sweden (1783), and with Prussia (1785). 92 Article 9 of the
treaty with Prussia stipulated: "The most perfect freedom of conscience and of worship is granted to the citizens: or subjects of
either party within ithe jurisdiotion of the other, without being liable to
molestation in that respect for any other cause than an insult on the
religion of others." 93 Comparable protection against religious discrimination was provided for in the bilateral treaties concluded by the
United States with, respectively, China, Japan, Siam, the Congo,
Germany, Ecuador, Honduras, Austria, Norway, Poland, Finland,
Liberia, and Iraq. 94 The protection offered by these treaties was
"reciprocal" and extensive, providing for "freedom of public worship,
with due reservation of proper requirements, for foreigners to enjoy
the same rights and benefits as nationals, including residence, travel,
and the right to hold property for religious purposes, with express or
implied right to conduct religious, educational, and philanthropic
work." 95
Transnational efforts toward eliminating religious discrimination
were fortified with the establishment of the League of Nations. The
Covenant of the League, in article 22(5), held a Mandatory
"responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions
which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion." 96 Thus,
90. M. GANJI, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 17 (1962) (footnote omitted). For further details, see id. at 17-44.
91. See M. BATES, supra note 1, at 477-87, 542-43; R. WILSON, UNITED STATES
COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 244-79 (1960).
92. M. BATES, supra note 1, at 485.
93. Quoted in id. at 485-86.
94. Id. at 479, 486.
95. Id. at 486. Cf. R. HIGGINS, supra note 78, at 23-39.
96. The mandate system of the League was designed, at the end of World War I,
to detach the territories of the defeated powers (i.e., Turkish territories and the
German colonies in Africa and Oceania) and to entrust them to mandatory powers.
For further details and subsequent development, see N. BENTWICH, THE MANDATES
SYSTEM (1930); R. CHoWDHURI, INTERNATIONAL MANDATES AND TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEMS (1955); LEAGUE OF NATIONS, THE MANDATE SYSTEM (1945); A. MARGALITH,
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article 1 of the French Mandate for Togoland (or the Cameroons)
(Class B) stipulated:
The Mandatory shall ensure in the territory complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, which are consonant with public order and morality; missionaries who are nationals
of States Members of the League of Nations shall be free to enter
the territory and to travel and reside therein, to acquire and possess
property, to erect religious buildings, and to open schools throughout
the territory; it being understood, however, that the Mandatory shall
have the right to exercise such control as may be necessary for the
maintenance of public order and good government, and to take all
measures required for such control. 97

Similarly, the South African Mandate for South-West Africa (Class
C) provided:
Subject to the provisions of any local law for the maintenance of public order and public morals, the Mandatory shall ensure in the territory freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, and shall allow all missionaries, nationals of any State Member
of the League of Nations, to enter into, travel and reside in the territory for the purpose of prosecuting their calling. 98

Further important efforts to advance the goal of religious freedom
were made under League auspices through the international regime of
minority protection. Religious minorities were among the minority
groups that the League of Nations was empowered to protect. 00 In
post-World War I arrangements (effected through both treaty stipulations and League resolutions), designed by the League to shelter
minority groups from discrimination and oppression, a profound
concern was manifested for religious freedom. The Treaty with
Poland, signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919,100 served as a prototype for comparable arrangements with a number of other states
including Czechoslovakia, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Romania,
Greece, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Turkey (through treaty
THE INTERNATIONAL MANDATES (1930); J. MURRAY, THE UNITED NATIONS TRUSTEE·
SHIP SYSTEM (1957); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 212-42 (8th ed. H.
Lauterpacht 1955); L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OP
HUMAN RIGHTS 337-504 (1973); C. TOUSSAINT, THE TRUSTEESHIP OF THE UNITED
NATIONS (1956); E. VAN MANNEN-HELMER, THE MANDATES SYSTEM IN RELATION TO
AFRICA AND THE PACIFIC ISLANDS (1929); Q. WRIGHT, MANDATES UNDER THB LEAGUE
OF NATIONS (1930). See generally Chen, Self-Determination as a Human Right, in
TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY (W. Reisman & B. Weston eds.
forthcoming).
97. Quoted in Bates, supra note 1, at 488.
98. Reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OP HUMAN
RIGHTS 242, 244 (L. Sohn & T. Buergenthal eds. 1973) [hereinafter BASIC
DOCUMENTS] (art. 5).
99. See McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 47, at 1054-56.
100. Reprinted in LEAGUE OP NATIONS, PROTECTION OF LINGUISTIC, RACIAL AND
RELIGIOUS MINORITIES BY THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 1927 J.B. 2, at 41-45.
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stipulation) and Albania, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Iraq
(through League resolutions). 101
A close examination of the provisions of the treaty with Poland
documents the deep demand existing at that time for protection
against religious discrimination. Article 2 of the treaty obliged Poland to "assure full and complete protection of life and liberty" to all
of its inhabitants "without distinction" as to "religion" or other factors.102 The same article afforded more general protection: "All
inhabitants of Poland shall be entitled to the free exercise, whether
public or private, of any creed, religion, or belief, whose practices are
not inconsistent with public order or public morals." 103 "All Polish
nationals," according to article 7, "shall be equal before the law and
shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to
race, language or religion." 104 "Differences of religion, creed or
confession," the article added, "shall not prejudice any Polish national
in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as for
instance admission to public employments, functions and honours, or
the exercise of professions and industries."105 Finally, article 8
provided:
Polish nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities
shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as the
other Polish nationals. In particular they shall have an equal right
to establish, manage and control at their own expense charitable, religious educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely therein. 106

All of these provisions were recognized under article 1, as "fundamental laws" and, hence, the treaty stipulated that "no law, regulation
or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor
shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them." 107
Furthermore, these duties were, pursuant to article 12, made "obligations of international concern" and placed "under the guarantee of
the League of Nations." 108
The contemporary proscription against religious discrimination,
like comparable proscriptions concerning race and sex,109 is firmly
established in the Charter of the United Nations and has been further
amplified in related human rights instruments. In the Charter provi101. See id.
102. Id. at 43.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. When people are deprived of the opportunity to become nationals
because of religious beliefs, however, such a provision is futile.
106. Id. at 44.
107. Id. at 42.
108. Id. at 44.
109. See McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 47, at 1042-86; McDougal,
Lasswell & Chen, Human Rights for Women and World Public Order: The Outlawing
of Sex-Based Discrimination, 69 AM. J. INTL. L. 497 (1975).
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sions concerning discrimination, religion is consistently specified,
along with race, sex, and language, as an impermissible ground of
differentiation.11° At the San Francisco Conference of 1945, it was
proposed (notably by Latin American delegations) that detailed
guarantees of freedom of conscience and religion be incorporated in
the Charter; however, these proposals were not accepted. 111 Instead, by repeatedly employing the familiar formula of "human rights
and fundamental freedom~ for all, without distinction as to race, sex,
language or religion,"112 the Charter established a more general
norm prohibiting discrimination. This policy was first implemented
in the post-World War II peace treaties concluded in 1947 by the
Allied Powers with Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy, and Romania.
Each state pledged to undertake "all measures necessary to secure
to all persons under [its] jurisdiction, without distinction as to race,
sex, language or religion, the enjoyment of human rights and of the
fundamental freedoms, including freedom . . . of religious worship.
"113

In attempting to explicate the Charter's comprehensive prohibition of discrimination, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in
article 2, specifies religion as among the impermissible grounds of
differentiation. 114 This general prohibition of discrimination is made
more explicit in article 18:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or
private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship or observance.11 5
Article 1, by proclaiming that all human beings are "endowed with

reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit
of brotherhood,"116 further affirms the right of the individual to
explore and define a personal orientation toward other persons and
the universe. In order to implement this aspiration, article 26(2)
110. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3; art. 13, para l(b); art. 55(c); art. 62, para. 2;
art. 76(c).
111. A. KruSHNASWAMI, supra note 1, at 12.
112. See Charter provisions cited in note 110 supra.
113. Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, Feb. 10, 1947, art 2, No. 643, 41 U.N.T.S.
21; Treaty of Peace with Hungary, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 2, No. 644, 41 U.N.T.S. 135;
Treaty of Peace with Romania, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 3, No. 645, 42 U.N.T.S. 3; Treaty
of Peace with Finland, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 6, No. 746, 48 U.N.T.S. 203. See also
Treaty of Peace with Italy, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 19(4), No. 747, 49 U.N.T.S. 3 (with a
slight variation in wording from the preceding provisions).
114. G.A. Resolution 217A(Ill), U.N. GAOR pt. 1, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948),
reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUMENTS OF nm UNITED NATIONS 1, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/1 (1973) [hereinafter
U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS].
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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urges that education be directed to "promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups." 117
Important protection for religious groups can also be found in a
number of relatively recent conventions, including the Genocide Convention of 1948.118 This convention seeks "to prevent and to punish" certain acts "committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part," religious groups, among others; the acts prohibited include
"killing members of the group," causing members of a protected
group "serious bodily or mental harm," deliberate infliction of living
conditions calculated to bring about group destruction, "measures
intended to prevent births within the group," and forcible transfer of
children.11 9 The convention also punishes "conspiracy," "incitement," "attempt to commit," and "complicity in genocide.m 2 o Both
the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and the
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954) protect
refugees and stateless persons from religious discrimination and accord them "national treatment" with regard to "freedom to practice
their religion and freedom as regards the religious education of their
children." 121 The Discrimination (Employment and Occupation).
Convention of 1958, which aspires to bring about "equality of opportunity of treatment in employment or occupation," includes religion
among the prohibited grounds of differentiation. 122 Similarly, the
Convention against Discrimination in Education of 1960, designed to
ensure "equality of opportunity and treatment for all in education,"
specifically prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion. 123
In the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
adopted by the General Assembly in 1966 (taking effect on March
23, 1976), religion is included in both the general provision against
discrimination in the enjoyment of all human rights under article
118. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, No. 1021, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, reprinted in U.N.
HUMAN RIGIITS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 114, at 41.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Article 3 provides that "[t]he Contracting States shall apply the provisions
of this Convention to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion or
country of origin," and article 4 reads: ''The Contracting States shall accord to
refugees within their territories treatment at least as favourable as that accorded
to their nationals with respect to freedom to practice their religion and freedom as regards the religious education of their children." Convention relating to
the Status of Stateless Persons, Sept. 9, 1954, No. 5158, 360 U.N.T.S. 130, reprinted
in U.N. HUMAN RIGIITS !N5I"RUMENTS, supra note 114, at 61. Comparable provisions
are found in articles 3 and 4 of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,
July 28, 1951, No. 254, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, reprinted in U.N. HUMAN Rimrrs
!N5I"RUMENTS, supra, at 68.
122. Convention concerning Discrimination in respect to Employment and Occupation, June 25, 1958, No. 5181, 362 U.N.T.S. 31, reprinted in U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS
lN5I"RUMENTS, supra note 114, at 29.
123. Dec. 14, 1960, No. 6193, 429 U.N.T.S. 93, reprinted in U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS
INSTRUMENTS, supra note 114, at 31.
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2(1) 124 and in the equal protection clause under article 26. 125 The
prohibition of discrimination is regarded as of such overriding importance that states are forbidden to practice discrimination on the
ground of religion (or on the ground of race, color, sex, language, or
social origin) where derogations from their obligations would otherwise be justified by "public emergency" under article 4(1). 128 In
article 18(1), the basic content of the right so emphatically protected
is defined by prescribing complete freedom of choice regarding rectitude: ''Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or -to
adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest
his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. "127 Article 18(2) further insulates this right by providing protection against coercion that would "impair" an individual's "freedom
to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice."128 Article
18(3) then expresses the recognition that this freedom, like other
rights, is subject to the necessity of appropriate accommodation with
the aggregate common interest. 129 In addition, article 24(1) provides that the special protection accorded to children is to be effected
without discrimination on account of religion, 130 and article 27 specifically includes religious minorities among the protected minority
groups.1a1
Similarly, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (adopted by the General Assembly in 1966 and
124. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966),
reprinted in U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 114, at 8.

125. Id.
126. Article 4(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
reads:
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant
may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant
to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that
such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour,
sex, language, religion or social origin.
Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Article 18(3) reads: "Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect
public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of
others." Id.
130. Article 24(1) provides: "Every child shall have, without any discrimination
as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth,
the right to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on
the part of his family, society and the State." Id.
131. Article 27 stipulates: "In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to
profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language." Id.
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becoming operative on January 3, 1976) contains, in article 2(2), a
comprehensive guarantee that the rights stipulated in the covenant
will be exercised without discrimination on the ground of religion. 132
Article 13(1) amplifies this guarantee by proclaiming that education
be directed to "enable all persons to participate effectively in a free
society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all
nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups." 133 It may be
recalled, finally, that the Proclamation of Teheran of 1968 insists that
it is "imperative that the members of the international community
fulfill their solemn obligations to promote and encourage respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions
of any kind," including "religion."134
Both the continuing demand for more tightly articulated international prescriptions to ensure religious freedom and the difficulty
involved in formulating such prescriptions are demonstrated by the
efforts within the United Nations to formulate a convention and a
declaration on elimination of all forms of religious intolerance. At
its seventeenth session in 1962, the General Assembly (in response to
recurring manifestations of anti-Semitism and other forms of racial
and religious prejudice) decided to formulate a declaration and a
convention on "the elimination of all forms of religious intolerance,"
paralleling a set of instruments on "the elimination of all forms of
racial discrimination." 135 Although the Declaration and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination were
successively adopted by the General Assembly in 1963 and in 1965
(the latter taking effect on January 4, 1969),136 the contemplated
declaration and convention on the elimination of religious intolerance
are yet to be completed. This "marked contrast," characterized by
"the stormy course of the instruments dealing with religious intolerance,"137 has been caused by a coalition of delegations seeking to
downplay the issues of anti-Semitism and other forms of religious
intolerance. 138 Religious warfare, it would appear, is not entirely an
132. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966),
reprinted in U.N. HUMAN RIGIITS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 114, at 3.
133. Id.
134. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 32/41 (1968), reprinted in U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS
INSTRUMENTS, supra note 114, at 18.
135. See McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 47, at 1058-60.
136. Id.
137. Liskofsky, Eliminating Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or
Belief: The U.N. Role, REPORTS ON nm FOREIGN SCENE, Feb. 1968, No. 8, at 1, 3.
138. See McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 47, at 1058-60• . See also
Liskofsky, supra note 137, at 3-4.
·
For the legislative history of the proposed declaration and the proposed convention on the elimination of religious intolerance and discrimination, see Manifestations
of Racial Prejudice and National and Religious Intolerance (Report of the SecretaryGeneral), U.N. Doc. A/6347 (1966); Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance (Note by the Secretary-General), U.N. Doc. A/7177 (1968); Elimination of All
Forms of Religious Intolerance (Note by the Secretary-General), U.N. Doc. A/7930
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affair of the past. In 1964 (two years after the Assembly's decision
to formulate a declaration and a convention), the Sub-Commission
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities submitted a preliminary draft declaration139 to the Commission on Human
Rights, which, through a fifteen-member Working Group, was able to
agree only upon six of the proposed articles. 140 After reporting this
outcome to the Assembly through the Economic and Social Council
and seeking further instructions, 141 the Commission began preparing
a draft convention.
In 1965, the Sub-Commission presented a preliminary draft convention to the Commission. 142 Building upon the Sub-Commission's
draft, the Commission, at its sessions from 1965 to 1967, adopted a
preamble and twelve articles but was unable ,to consider the proposed
articles on measures of implementation.143 The Commission's draft
convention, together with other related proposals not considered by
the Commission, was transmitted to the General Assembly in 1967 by
the Economic and Social Council; the Council also expressed the
hope that the Assembly would decide on appropriate implementation
provisions. 144 The Assembly considered the draft convention at its
twenty-second session in 1967 and decided to change its title to draft
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination based on Religion or Belief;145 however,
since the 1967 session, the Assembly has deferred consideration of
the draft convention.
In December 1972, the Assembly decided to "accord priority to
the completion of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
(1970); Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance (Note by the SecretaryGeneral), U.N. Doc. A/8330 (1971) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/8330]; Elimination
of All Forms of Religious Intolerance (Report of the Third Committee), U.N. Doc.
A 9322 (1973); Draft Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious
Intolerance (Working Paper prepared by the Secretariat), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1145
(1973 ).
139. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON nm TwENTIETII SESSION, 37
U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 8, at 69-74, U.N. Doc. E/3873 (E/CN.4/874) (1964). The
full text of the preliminary draft of a "United Nations Declaration on the Elimination
of All Forms of Religious Intolerance, Prepared by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discriminaiton and Protection of Minorities" [hereinafter Sub-Commission
Draft Declaration] is conveniently attached as an annex to U.N. Doc. A/8330, supra
note 138.
140. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 139, at 74-81; U.N. Doc,
A/8330, supra note 138, at 4. The text of the articles as prepared by the Working
Group [hereinafter Working Group Draft Declaration] is attached as an annex. to
U.N. Doc. A/8330, supra.
141. U.N. Doc. A/8330, supra note 138, at 4-5.
142. Id. at 5. The draft convention [hereinafter Commission Draft Convention]
is also attached as an annex to U.N. Doc. A/8330.
143. Id. at 6.
144. ECOSOC Res. 1233, 42 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 1, at 13, U.N. Doc. E/4393
(1967).
145. U.N. Doc. A/8330, supra note 138, at 7.
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Religious Intolerance before resuming consideration of the International Convention on this subject."146 The Assembly instructed that
the drafts previously prepared in 1964 by the Sub-Commission and
the Working Group of the Commission on Human Rights be circulated to member states and specialized agencies for comments.147 It
further urged "the adoption, if possible, of such a Declaration as part
of the observance of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights" in 1973.148 Yet, in 1973, the task
remained unfinished and its consideration took a new tum. While
reaffirming the priority accorded to the "completion of the Declaration," in December of 1973, the Assembly indicated that "the preparation of a draft Declaration" required "additional study." Accordingly, it instructed the Commission on Human Rights to "submit, if
possible, a single draft Declaration to the Assembly at its twenty-ninth
session" in 1974 in the light of the suggestions, comments, and
amendments recently received. 149 The Commission was, however,
nowhere near the completion of its newly assigned task at its thirtieth
and thirty-first sessions held in 1974 and 1975.150 In view of the
slow progress within the Commission, it is unclear when the draft
declaration will be completed and adopted by the General Assembly;
moreover, completion of the draft convention appears to be even a
more remote possibility.
Despite the delay in their completion and adoption, the contours
of :the proposed declaration and ·the proposed convention have been
146. G. A. Res. 3027, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 30, at 72, U.N. Doc. A/8730
(1972).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. G. A. Res. 3069, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 30, at 77-78, U.N. Doc. A/9030
(1973). See also G. A. Res. 3267, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 31, at 88-89, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1975); Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance (Report of the
Third Committee), U.N. Doc. A/9893 (1974).
For recent comments by various governments, see Draft Declaration on the
Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance (Report of the Secretary General),
U.N. Doc. A/9134 (1973); Analytical presentation of the observations received from
Governments concerning the draft Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Religious Intolerance (Note by the Secretary-General), U.N. Doc. A/9135 (1973);
Draft Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance (Report
of the Secretary-General), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1146 (1974).
150. Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Thirtieth Session (4 Feb.-8
March 1974), 56 U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 5, at 7, 18-22, 57, U.N. Doc. E/5464
(E/CN.4/1154) (1974). After considerable debate in its Thirtieth Session in 1974
about ways and means of accelerating the preparation of a single draft declaration,
the Commission has set up "an informal Working Group open to all members of the
Commission." Id. at 19. The informal Working Group, with Mr. Pierre Juvigny
(France) serving as Chairman-Rapporteur, agreed to proceed on the basis of "consensus," and was able to consider only "the title and the first two preambular paragraphs
of a draft Declaration" in the six meetings it held in February 1974.
For an account of the limited progress made in 1975, see Commission on Human
Rights, Report on the Thirty-First Session (3 Feb.-7 March 1975), 58 U.N. ECOSOC
Supp. 4, at 4, 36-41, U.N. Doc. E/5635 (E/CN.4/1179) (1975).
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sufficiently articulated in the available drafts to make it possible to
anticipate :their ultimate form. Taken together, the respective drafts
of the declaration proposed by the Sub-Commission151 and the Working Group of the Commission on Human Rights, 152 along with the
draft convention prepared by the Commission,153 appear to parallel
ithe Declaration and the Convention on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination. This parallelism is observable in proposed provisions concerning the grounds of differentiation prohibited, the rights
protected, the specific acts forbidden, and the actors precluded from
engaging in discrimination. 154
Discrimination on the ground of religion or belief is condemned
as an "offence to human dignity," "a denial of the principles of the
Charter of the United Nations," "a violation of the human rights and
fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights," and "an obstacle to friendly and peaceful relations
among nations." 155 In terms as broad and inclusive as those used in
the racial convention, the draft convention defines "discrimination on
the ground of religion or belier' to mean "any distinction, exclusion,
restriction or preference based on religion or belief which has the
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, or any
other field of public life."156 The terms "religion or belief" are
defined as including "theistic, non-theistic, and atheistic beliefs." 157
In recognition of the "complexities of the issues involved in the
elaboration of standards for religious liberty in a world community of
diverse beliefs and institutions,"158 article 1(4) of the draft convention adds: ''Neither the establishment of a religion nor the recognition of a religion or belief by a State nor the separation of Church
from State shall by itself be considered religious intolerance or discrimination on the ground of religion or belief."100 This provision
appears to be an unfortunate departure from the conventional wisdom
that the establishment or recognition of an official religion may
promote intolerance of other beliefs. 160
151. Sub-Commission Draft Declaration, supra note 139.
152. Working Group Draft Declaration, supra note 140.
153. Commission Draft Convention, supra note 142.
154. See McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 47, at 1060-72.
155. Sub-Commission Draft Declaration, supra note 139, art. 1, at 2; Working
Group Draft Declaration, supra note 140, art. 2, at 2.
156. Commission Draft Convention, supra note 142, art. l(b), at 2.
157. Commission Draft Convention, supra note 142, art. l(a).
158. Abram, supra note 1, at 46.
159. Commission Draft Convention, supra note 142, art. l(d), at 2.
160. In the words of Krishnaswami:
For centuries. a close relationship existed in almost all countries between the
State and the predominant religion. This religion enjoyed a special status, either
because it had been recognized as the Established Church or because it had been
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The drafts of both the convention and the declaration contemplate comprehensive protection against religious discrimination. Thus,
the drafts speak in terms of protecting all of the "political, civic,
economic, social and cultural rights"161 and "human rights and fundamental freedoms" in "any other field of public life." 162 In the
course of considering which rights should be protected by the proposed instruments, however, a fundamental issue has been "whether
to deal only with discrimination based on religion or belief, e.g. in
employment, education, housing or citizenship, or, in addition, with
the 'freedom' of all to practice and manifest religion and belief."163
The response has thus far been in favor of the latter position; this
position appears to recognize that, in order to eliminate religious
intolerance and discrimination, it is essential to "keep fully in the
forefront the substance of the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion."164 "What would be the meaning of tolerance," it has
been asked, "without the affirmation of the rich substance of the
right, which all should be free to exercise?"165 Hence, both the draft
declaration and the draft convention make elaborate and detailed
provision for "the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or
belier' as the core freedom, indispensable to the achievement of an
environment free from discrimination on account of religion or belief.
This core freedom, to be extended to everyone, includes:
(1)

Freedom to adhere or not to adhere to any religion or belief
and to change his religion or belief in accordance with the dictates of his conscience . . . .

accepted as the State religion. Not infrequently recognition of the predominant
religion led to the total exclusion of all other religions, or at least to their reduction to a subordinate position. Thus in the past the mere existence in a country
of an Established Church or of a State religion usually connoted severe discrimination-and sometimes even outright persecution--directed against dissenters.
A. KRrsHNASWAMI, supra note 1, at 46. Commenting on this conventional wisdom,
he cautioned readers today not to jump to such an inference without a thorough
contextual scrutiny. Id. at 46-54.
In the same vein, Abram has explained:
Member States include those in which there is complete separation of Church
and State, those in which several religions are recognized by the State, and those
with a single Established Church or State religion. While it has often been argued that a particular juridical relationship logically determines a potential pattern of infringement of the rights of minority religions or beliefs, it seems difficult to confirm this argument in practice. . • .
The moral of these examples is easily drawn: the determinants of the religious freedom of a society include not only the juridical framework and the
laws of the State but also the mores of the society, including the value placed
upon this freedom by the major religions and ideologies within the society.
Abram, supra note 1, at 46-47.
161. Commission Draft Convention, supra note 142, art. 5, at 4. See also
Working Group Draft Declaration, supra note 140, art. 4(1), at 2.
162. Commission Draft Convention, supra note 142, art. l(b), at 2.
163. Liskofsky, supra note 137, at 3.
164. Observations made by the Commission of the Churches on International
Affairs to the Sub-Commission's Draft Declaration, reprinted in A. CARRILLO DE
ALBORNOZ, RELIGIOUS llBER1Y 32, 33 (1964).
165. Id.
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Freedom to manifest his religion or belief either alone or in
community with others, and in public or in private . . . .
Freedom to express opinion on questions concerning a religion or belief.
Freedom to worship, to hold assemblies related to religion or
belief. . . .
Freedom to teach, to disseminate and to learn his religion
or belief . . . .
Freedom to practise his religion or belief by establishing and
maintaining charitable and educational institutions . . . .
Freedom to observe the rituals, dietary and other practices
of his religion or belief . . . .
Freedom to make pilgrimages and other journeys in connection with his religion or belief. . . .
Equal legal protection for the places of worship or assembly,
the rites, ceremonies and activities, and the places of disposal
of the dead associated with his religion or belief;
Freedom to organize and maintain local, regional, national
and international associations in connexion with his religion or
belief. . . .
Freedom from compulsion to take an oath of a religious nature.1aa

The particular acts that would be prohibited by the draft convention and the draft declaration include "any distinction, exclusion,
restriction or preference" that "has the purpose or effect of nullifying
or impairing" equality in "recognition, enjoyment or exercise" of
protected rights. 167 The fourfold characterizations of "distinction,
exclusion, restriction or preference" are sufficiently broad to encompass a wide range of activities. 168 In addition, criminal sanctions
would be imposed for "[a]ny aot of violence against the adherents
of any religion or belief or against the means used for its practice, any
incitement to such acts or incitement to hatred likely to result in acts
of violence against any religion or belief or its adherents," 169 and "all
propaganda designed to foster or justify" such activities. 170
166. Commission Draft Convention, supra note 142, art. 3, at 2-3. See also SubCommission Draft Declaration, supra note 139, art. 6, at 3-4; Working Group Draft
Declaration, supra note 140, art. 6, at 3.
A further protection concerns the right of parents or legal guardians to bring up
their children in the religion or belief of their choice and their responsibility to
inculcate in their children tolerance for the religion of others. States would further
be obliged not to discriminate "in the granting of subsidies, in taxation or in
exemptions from taxation, between different religions or beliefs or their adherents."
Sub-Commission Draft Declaration, supra note 139, arts. 5, 12, at 2, 4. See also
Working Group Draft Declaration, supra note 140, art. 5, at 3; Commission Draft
Convention, supra note 142, art 4, at 3-4.
167. Commission Draft Convention, supra note 142, art. l(b), at 2.
168. See McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 47, at 1068-71.
169. Commission Draft Convention, supra note 142, art. 9, at 5.
170. Sub-Commisssion Draft Declaration, supra note 139, art. 14(2), at 5.
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In their efforts to secure the elimination of religious intolerance
and discrimination, the proposed drafts would, like the Declaration
and the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
bring both official and nonofficial actors within their authority: ''No
States, institution, group or individual" would be permitted to "make
any discrimination in matters of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the treatment of persons on the grounds of their religion or
their belief."171 These drafts also underscore the critical importance
of intra-national action to bring about the necessary internal changes
in both authoritative and effective power processes that would ensure
the maintenance of the freedoms sought to bei promoted by the
drafts. 172 The drafts manifest, finally, a deep realization of the
necessity of an appropriate accommodation of the rights and freedoms to be enjoyed by individuals with the aggregate common interest.11a

171. Id. art. 2, at 2. See also Working Group Draft Declaration, supra note 140,

art. 3(1), at 2.
172. Commission Draft Convention, supra note 142, art. 6, provides:
States Parties undertake to adopt immediate and effective measures, particularly
in the fields of teaching, education, culture and information, with a view to combating prejudices as, for example, anti-Semitism and other manifestations which
lead to religious intolerance and to discrimination on the ground of religion or
belief, and to promoting and encouraging, in the interest of universal peace, understanding, tolerance, co-operation and friendship among nations, groups and
individuals, irrespective of differences in religion or belief, in accordance with
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and this Convention.
Article 7 would oblige contracting states to
take effective measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination on the ground
of religion or belief, including the enactment or abrogation of laws OF regulations
where necessary to prohibit such discrimination by any person, group or organization, [and not to] pursue any policy or enact or retain laws or regulations
restricting or impeding freedom of conscience, religion or belief or the free and
open exercise thereof, nor discriminate against any person, group or organization
on account of membership or non-membership in, practice or non-practice of,
or adherence or non-adherence to any religion or belief.
Moreover, article 10 reads:
State Parties shall ensure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective protection and remedies, through the competent national tribunals and other State institutions, against any acts, including acts of discrimination on the ground of religion or belief, which violate his human rights and fundamental freedoms contrary to this Convention, as well as the right to seek from such tribunals just
and adequate reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as a result of
such acts.
See also Sub-Commission Draft Declaration, supra note 139, arts. 3(2), 14, at 2, 5;
Working Group Draft Declaration, supra note 140, arts. 3(2), at 2.
173. The Commission Draft Convention, supra note 142, provides:
11. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as giving to any person,
group, organization or institution the right to engage in activities aimed at
prejudicing national security, friendly relations between nations or the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
12. Nothing in this Convention shall be construed to preclude a State Party
from prescribing by law such limitations as are necessary to protect public
safety, order, health or moral or the individual rights and freedoms of others, or the general welfare in a democratic society.
Article 13(2) of the Sub-Commission Draft Declaration, supra note 139, reads:
The freedoms aI}d. rights set _out elsewhere in this Declaration shall be subject
only to the restnctions prescnbed by law solely for the purpose of securing due
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On the regional level, the principle of religious freedom is embodied both in general prescriptions banning discrimination that include
religion as a prohibited ground of differentiation and in more particular prescriptions that give substance to the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. Thus, the European Convention on Human
Rights includes religion, in article 14, as among the impermissible
grounds of differentiation174 and spells out the content of freedom of
religion in article 9. 175 Similarly, the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man176 proclaims, in art:iole 2, that "[a]ll
persons are equal before the law and have the rights and duties
established in this Declaration, without distinction as to race, sex,
language, creed or any other factor." Article 1(1) of the American
Convention on Human Rights177 expressly forbids discrimination on
account of religion, and this general principle is reinforced by the
equal protection clause of article 24; furthermore, article 27(1)
provides that a state may not take measures that involve religious
discrimination, even during a national emergency. The provision on
the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion is found in article
12, which (like article 9 of the European Convention) employs
wording essentially similar to that contained in article 18 of the
Universal Declaration and of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. 178
In addition to the prescriptions emanating from secular sources, it
is relevant to note that the fundamental philosophy of the world's
great religions has increasingly exhibited support (including fewer
demands for religious exclusivity and intolerance) for the principle of
freedom of choice about religion. 179 The principle of religious tolerance and freedom has become so deeply ingrained, both in the secular
and nonsecular worlds, that a number of the great religions have
recently issued manifestos in favor of religious freedom. The thrust
of this new global movement is powerfully demonstrated by the
Declaration on Religious Freedom, adopted by the Vatican TI Council
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting
the legitimate requirements of morality, health, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society. Any restrictions which may be imposed shall be
consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations and with the
rights and freedoms stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
These freedoms and rights may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes
and principles of the United Nations.
174. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 98, at 125.
115. Id.
116. Reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 98, at 187.
177. Reprinted in id. at 210.
118. See text at notes 115, 127-29 supra.
119. See A. CARRILLO DE .ALBORNOZ, supra note 77; L. JANSSENS, FREEDOM OF
CONSCIENCE AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (Lorenzo transl. 1966); RELIGIOUS FREEDOM,
supra note 77. Cf. Toth, The Churches and the New World Order, 11 WoRLD
JusncE 193 (1969).
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in 1965.180 Inspired in no small measure by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, this declaration pronounces that "the human
person has a right to religious freedom," 181 which "has its foundation
in the very dignity of the human person as this dignity is known
through the revealed word of God and by reason itself."182 Elaborating on this freedom, the declaration states that "all men are to be
immune from coercion on the part of individuals or of social groups
and of any human power, in such ways that no one is to be forced to
act in a manner contrary to his own beliefs, whether privately or
publicly, whether alone or in association with others, within due
limits."183 With this declaration-"an effort of the Church to catch
up with the recognition of a right previously asserted in secular,
protestant, Jewish and other religious traditions" 184-it has been
observed that "for the first time in many centuries, Christians are
unanimous in formally proclaiming the universality and inviolability
of religious freedom. They all agree that it is the right of every man
and every religious confession."185 A comparable trend is also observable in the non-Christian world. As Abram has put it, ''In
Judaism, in Islam, in Marxism, and in other religious or secular
movements, there have been formulated claims of ultimate truth and
of the special status that truth entails both for the believer and the
non-believer, on the one hand, and arguments for the freedom of
thought, conscience and religion of all men, on the other."186
The application of proscriptions against religious discrimination
is, of course, still left to the more general enforcement machinery
presently available for the protection of other human rights at varying
180. Reprinted in L. JANSSENS, supra note 179, at 145-60 and in A. CARRILLO DE
ALBORNOZ, supra note 77, at 169-87. See also A. CARRILLO DE ALBORNOZ, THE BASIS
OF RELIGIOUS LIBERlY (1963); FREEDOM AND MAN (J. Murray ed. 1965); RELIGIOUS
LmERlY: AN END AND A BEGINNING (J. Murray ed. 1966).
181. A. CARRILLO DE ALBORNOZ, supra note 77, at 170; L. JANSSENS, supra note
179, at 146.
182. A. CARRILLO DE ALBORNOZ, supra note 77, at 171; L. JANSSENS, supra note
179, at 147.
183. A. CARRILLO DE ALBORNOZ, supra note 77, at 170-71; L. JANSSENS, supra
note 179, at 146-47.
184. Abram, supra note 1, at 45-46.
185. A. CARRILLO DE ALBORNOZ, supra note 77, at 155. For the Declarations on
Religious Liberty issued by the World Council of Churches in 1948 and 1961, .see id.
at 189-99. The 1948 Declaration pronounced at the outset: ''The rights of religious
freedom herein declared shall be recognized and observed for all persons without
distinction as to race, colour, sex, language, or religion, and without imposition of
disabilities by virtue of legal provision of administrative acts." Id. at 189-90. It then
proceeded to declare that "Every person" has "the right" to "determine his own faith
and creed," to "express his religious beliefs in worship, teaching and practice, and to
proclaim the implications of his beliefs for relationships in a social or political
community," and to "associate with others and to organize with them for religious
purposes." Id. at 190-91. Cf. P. WOGAMAN, PROTESTANT FAITII AND RELIGIOUS
LmERlY (1967).
186. Abram, supra note 1, at 45. Cf. JUDAISM AND HUMAN RIGIITS (M. Konvitz
ed. 1972).
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community levels-national, regional, and global. 187 It is to be
hoped that the proposed International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion
or Belief, when finally adopted, will incorporate provisions for implementation comparable to those built into the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 188
Meanwhile, it may be noted that, because discriminatory practices are
sometimes based upon racial as well as religious grounds (such as
practices conventionally labeled "anti-Semitism"), the machinery of
implementation established for racial discrimination (especially the
implementation provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination) can sometimes be invoked to redress deprivations based upon religious grounds. 189
187. The general problem of implementation will be treated in detail in the
chapters of our forthcoming book relating to the world constitutive process of
authoritative decision.
188. Cf. McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 47, at 1080-86. See Prelimi-

nary Draft on Additional Measures of Implementation Transmitted to the Commis•
sion on Human Rights by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, annexed to U.N. Doc. A/8330, supra note 139. See also
Claydon, supra note 1, at 419-23.
189. With regard to many homogeneous groups it is difficult to tell whether
characterizations of the groi;ip are by religion, ethnicity, or language (e.g., the Ibo,
Dinka, or Zulu). This applies in both developing and developed countries. For such
groups, protection of freedom from discrimination upon religious grounds may on
occasion be secured by invocation and application of the prescriptions relating to race
or language. Cf. Coleman, The Problem of Anti-Semitism Under the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 2 HUMAN
RIGHTS J. 609 (1969); Lerner, Anti-Semitism as Racial and Religious Discrimination
Under United Nations Conventions, 1 ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 103 (1971);
McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 47, at 1061-86.
The ambiguities of religious and racial discrimination and other confusions are
hopelessly intermingled in the controversial resolution on Zionism adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly on Nov. 10, 1975, by a roll-call vote of 72 in
favor, 35 against, with 32 abstentions. G. A. Res. 3379 (XXX), Resolutions of the
General Assembly at Its Thirtieth Regular Session (16 Sept.-17 Dec. 1975), at 177,
U.N. Press Release GA/5438 (19 Dec. 1975); 12 U.N. MoNTIILY CHRONICLE, No.
11, at 56 (1975). This resolution would appear more a gambit in a series.of political
maneuvers than an effective condemnation, or expression, of either racial or religious
discrimination. For a review of the history and possible consequences of this
resolution, see The Sixth Report of the Committee on Human Rights, the American
Branch, International Law Association (March 1976) (to be published in 1976
Annual of the American Branch). See also Assembly Determines Zionism ls Form
of Racism as Measures Against Racial Discrimination Adopted, 12 U.N. MoNTIILY
CHRONICLE, No. 11, at 37 (1975); El-Messiri, Zionism and Racism, N.Y. Times, Nov.
13, at 41, col. 2 (city ed.); Glazer, Zionism Examined, id. Dec. 13, 1975, at 27, col.
3; id. Nov. 11, 1975; at 1, col. 1.
For background readings on Zionism, see S. Am.sTRoM, supra note 73, at 972-76
(1972); I. CoHEN, THE ZIONISI' MOVEMENT (1945); FROM HAVEN TO CONQUEST:
READINGS IN ZIONSIM AND TIIE PALESTINE PROBLEM UNTIL 1948 (W. el-Khalidi ed.
1971); J. GONEN, A PSYCHOiilSI'ORY OF ZIONISM (1975); S, HALPERIN, THE
PoLmCAL WORLD OF AMERICAN ZIONISM (1961); B. HALPERN, THE IDEA OF TIIB
JEWISH STATE (2d ed. 1969); THE ZIONISI' lDEA: A HrsroRICAL ANALYSIS AND READER
(A. Hertzberg ed. 1959); T. HERZL, THE JEWISH STATE (DER JUDENSI'AAT) (H. Zohn
transl. 1970); W. LAQUEUR, A HISTORY OF ZIONISM (1972); 2 B. MARTIN, A HISTORY

April 1976]

N.

Religious Freedom and World Public Order

897

THE INCLUSIVE CoNTEXT OF RELIGIOUS AND
OTHER BASIC FREEDOMS OF BELIBF

The trend of past decision in the world community regarding
matters of fundamental belief has been largely confined to the task of
formulating acceptable prescriptions. Thus, the world community
has yet to reach a consensus as to a system of presumptively authoritative expectations that can be invoked or applied in the area of
religious discrimination. Nevertheless, it appears that the rising volume of national decisions implementing national prescriptions will
one day be recognized as the preliminary phase of a process that
marks the eventual appearance and consolidation of an effective
international law of human rights in matters of religious conviction.
The intensified demands manifested in the drafting of declarations and conventions have already exercised a profound effect upon
the perceived policies of the emerging system of world public order. It
is, for example, more widely understood than ever before that "religious" freedom is not ultimately to be construed as faith in any
particular version of divinity. The confrontations that have taken
place between spokesmen for believers in a single God and spokesmen for believers in a plurality of gods have educated many of these
leaders to concede the good faith and the depth of commitment of all
concerned. A similar confrontation has had a parallel effect among
exponents of divinity and "atheistic" champions of an impersonal
flow of determining forces in the universe. Even more striking,
perhaps, is the partial acceptance of "doubters" or "searchers"-those
who have chosen to withhold commitment to any theological or
metaphysical body of doctrine and practice. The scientific attitude
toward the world, for example, is widely interpreted to exclude other
than an exploratory and tentative attitude toward the universe.
For the future it is not implausible to predict that science-based
technology will continue to spread, and that the tension between
tentative versus dogmatic attitudes will become one of the most
polarizing forces within the world community. The conception of
religious freedom will probably come to be understood to include
"freedom of fundamental orientation" toward the universal manifold
of events; however, considerations of political unity may be expected
to interfere with the genuine acceptance of this idea. When the unity
of a body politic seems to be endangered by minorities of Christians,
Jews, or adherents of other religious faiths, or by those who openly
profess an "atheistic" or "agnostic" position, it will often be a simple
OF JUDAISM 319-48 (1974); 0. RABINOWICZ, ARNOLD TOYN13EE ON JUDAISM AND
ZIONISM: A CRITIQUE (1974); R. STEVENS, AMERICAN ZIONISM AND U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY, 1942-1947 (1962); J. TALMON, ISRAEL AMONG THE NATIONS (1970); PALESTINE: A SE.ARCH FOR TRum (A. Taylor & R. Tetlie eds. 1970); D. VITAL, 'Iim
ORIGINS OF ZIONISM (1975).

898

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 74:865

matter to single out and identify members of these groups. During
crisis periods, discriminatory measures will often be leveled against
those perceived as dissident individuals and groups. If the level of
crisis intensifies, it is overwhelmingly probable that the demand for
political unity will tend to rigidify the position of whatever systems of
belief are current among the power elites.
Under circumstances of fear and anxiety, it is well known that
words and emblems may be among the instruments most relied upon
to maintain a tolerable level of reassurance; conversely, exposure to
assertions of disbelief or doubt, or to gestures of rejection, present
occasions for symbolic defense. The demand to conform typically
goes beyond insistence on verbal conformity; the proper words must
also be uttered in tones that are recognized modes of expressing
conviction. "Tentativeness" arouses suspicions of disloyalty or treason, and the range of tolerance afforded to variety and deviation is
narrowed by both public and private acts.
Thus, it can be seen that the difficulties that have retarded the
evolution of a comprehensive code of rights to protect freedom of
religion and belief are likely to continue for the foreseeable future.
Nevertheless, arrangements designed to extend and maintain the basic
freedom to worship and to choose a belief system will continue to
influence the differences and apprehensions that divide the members
of the world community from one another. Freedom of belief is a
tenacious yet delicate achievement in the history of mankind.

